From Pig to Pork: How Society Rewires Our Empathy
Augustus Farrell
Fetching a ball, showing empathy, having distinct personalities, singing songs to their offspring, understanding commands, and saving humans are all abilities that pigs possess (Marino & Colvin, 2015). As it turns out, pigs have a mental aptitude equal to or even higher than dogs (Rekiel et al., 2023); however, one animal is overwhelmingly seen as “food” while the other is seen as “man’s best friend.” This example showcases how humans attribute different moral worths to animals based on species alone, an idea called speciesism.
Contrary to public belief, studies show that farm animals—pigs, in this case—are sentient, meaning they have the capacity to feel pain and suffer (Kumar et al., 2019). However, the widespread and unnecessary suffering they endure is often overlooked, largely because it serves human convenience. This contradiction isn’t necessarily hypocrisy; it may stem from how the brain processes moral distance, empathy, and social norms. In fact, research shows that children view eating animals as less morally acceptable compared to adults, suggesting a learned trait allowing the brain to justify behavior that contradicts early moral instincts (McGuire et al., 2022).
One explanation for this contradiction could be moral distance. Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume referred to this phenomenon by saying, “The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant” (1739). Put simply, moral distance refers to the “degree of moral obligation” that a person feels they have towards someone else (Aguiar et al., 2023).
In the case of animals, this distance is often reinforced by social norms that categorize some species as pets and others as food, suppressing our moral intuition. The same animal can even be called two different things, for example a “pig” or “pork.” In response, people may experience emotional dissonance, leading to a diminished sense of empathy. For example, people often feel sad when they see a farm animal’s living conditions but society expects indifference—“it’s normal.” Repeated emotional dissonance and normalization likely lead to the diminished empathy towards animals observed in adults compared to children. Reducing this emotional response works as a defense mechanism to avoid discomfort (Dunn et al., 2009). Importantly, their suffering is not any less real; only our emotional response is reduced. This psychological separation helps explain how compassionate individuals can support systems that harm animals without conscious cruelty.
This learned emotional distancing has a neurological basis. Mirror neurons are specialized brain cells that are activated both when someone performs an action and upon observing someone else do an action. In the context of suffering, these neurons stimulate another person’s pain internally, forming the foundation of empathy (Iacoboni, 2022). Mirror neurons operate as part of the brain’s “bottom-up processing” system (Jankowiak-Siuda et al., 2011). In bottom-up processing, the brain takes in sensory information, interprets it, and automatically generates an emotional or behavioral response based on that raw input, often subconsciously. However, “top-down processing” can override this. In top-down processing, the brain uses what it already knows to interpret—or in this case, filter—sensory information. Put simply, bottom-up processing is like being open-minded while top-down processing is like having a preconception.
An explanation for the previously mentioned learned trait that allows the brain to justify behavior that contradicts early moral instincts may lie in the ability of top-down processing to override bottom-up reactions (Avital-Cohen et al., 2022). When someone is taught that pigs are “pork” rather than sentient beings deserving of compassion, the brain may blunt its empathetic response, even when witnessing their suffering. Cultural norms, like this one, may act as filters in top-down processing, reducing activity in empathy-related brain regions. For example, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies have shown reduced activity in the anterior insula when participants viewed “outgroup” members experiencing pain (Hein et al., 2010). Notably, brain activity in the nucleus accumbens predicted a reduced likelihood of helping those in pain, supporting the idea that social biases can influence the brain’s response to others’ suffering (Hein et al., 2010). So, while the capacity for empathy remains, social labels like “pork” and the objectification of animals likely act as filters that suppress the bottom-up empathetic emotions before they reach conscious awareness.
Returning to the comparison between pigs and dogs, the stark contrast in treatment appears rooted not in moral reasoning but in tradition—what has “always been done.” These findings suggest that, especially societally, our instinctive morality is often trumped by cultural norms. Recognizing this poses a difficult question: how many of our moral choices are shaped not by empathy but by social conditioning? Perhaps the brain’s moral decisions are not purely rational or innate but shaped by culture, learning, and cognitive processing—revealing that our treatment of animals may have less to do with morality and more to do with learned perception.
About the Author
Augustus Farrell is a student at Saint Francis Borgia High School.
References
Contrary to public belief, studies show that farm animals—pigs, in this case—are sentient, meaning they have the capacity to feel pain and suffer (Kumar et al., 2019). However, the widespread and unnecessary suffering they endure is often overlooked, largely because it serves human convenience. This contradiction isn’t necessarily hypocrisy; it may stem from how the brain processes moral distance, empathy, and social norms. In fact, research shows that children view eating animals as less morally acceptable compared to adults, suggesting a learned trait allowing the brain to justify behavior that contradicts early moral instincts (McGuire et al., 2022).
One explanation for this contradiction could be moral distance. Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume referred to this phenomenon by saying, “The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant” (1739). Put simply, moral distance refers to the “degree of moral obligation” that a person feels they have towards someone else (Aguiar et al., 2023).
In the case of animals, this distance is often reinforced by social norms that categorize some species as pets and others as food, suppressing our moral intuition. The same animal can even be called two different things, for example a “pig” or “pork.” In response, people may experience emotional dissonance, leading to a diminished sense of empathy. For example, people often feel sad when they see a farm animal’s living conditions but society expects indifference—“it’s normal.” Repeated emotional dissonance and normalization likely lead to the diminished empathy towards animals observed in adults compared to children. Reducing this emotional response works as a defense mechanism to avoid discomfort (Dunn et al., 2009). Importantly, their suffering is not any less real; only our emotional response is reduced. This psychological separation helps explain how compassionate individuals can support systems that harm animals without conscious cruelty.
This learned emotional distancing has a neurological basis. Mirror neurons are specialized brain cells that are activated both when someone performs an action and upon observing someone else do an action. In the context of suffering, these neurons stimulate another person’s pain internally, forming the foundation of empathy (Iacoboni, 2022). Mirror neurons operate as part of the brain’s “bottom-up processing” system (Jankowiak-Siuda et al., 2011). In bottom-up processing, the brain takes in sensory information, interprets it, and automatically generates an emotional or behavioral response based on that raw input, often subconsciously. However, “top-down processing” can override this. In top-down processing, the brain uses what it already knows to interpret—or in this case, filter—sensory information. Put simply, bottom-up processing is like being open-minded while top-down processing is like having a preconception.
An explanation for the previously mentioned learned trait that allows the brain to justify behavior that contradicts early moral instincts may lie in the ability of top-down processing to override bottom-up reactions (Avital-Cohen et al., 2022). When someone is taught that pigs are “pork” rather than sentient beings deserving of compassion, the brain may blunt its empathetic response, even when witnessing their suffering. Cultural norms, like this one, may act as filters in top-down processing, reducing activity in empathy-related brain regions. For example, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies have shown reduced activity in the anterior insula when participants viewed “outgroup” members experiencing pain (Hein et al., 2010). Notably, brain activity in the nucleus accumbens predicted a reduced likelihood of helping those in pain, supporting the idea that social biases can influence the brain’s response to others’ suffering (Hein et al., 2010). So, while the capacity for empathy remains, social labels like “pork” and the objectification of animals likely act as filters that suppress the bottom-up empathetic emotions before they reach conscious awareness.
Returning to the comparison between pigs and dogs, the stark contrast in treatment appears rooted not in moral reasoning but in tradition—what has “always been done.” These findings suggest that, especially societally, our instinctive morality is often trumped by cultural norms. Recognizing this poses a difficult question: how many of our moral choices are shaped not by empathy but by social conditioning? Perhaps the brain’s moral decisions are not purely rational or innate but shaped by culture, learning, and cognitive processing—revealing that our treatment of animals may have less to do with morality and more to do with learned perception.
About the Author
Augustus Farrell is a student at Saint Francis Borgia High School.
References
- Aguiar, F., Brañas-Garza, P., & Miller, L. M. (2008). Moral distance in dictator games. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(4), 344-354.
- Avital-Cohen, R., & Tsal, Y. (2016). Top-down processes override bottom-up interference in the flanker task. Psychological Science, 27(5), 651-658.
- Dunn, B. D., Billotti, D., Murphy, V., & Dalgleish, T. (2009). The consequences of effortful emotion regulation when processing distressing material: A comparison of suppression and acceptance. Behaviour research and therapy, 47(9), 761-773.
- Hein, G., Silani, G., Preuschoff, K., Batson, C. D., & Singer, T. (2010). Neural responses to ingroup and outgroup members' suffering predict individual differences in costly helping. Neuron, 68(1), 149-160.
- Hume, D. (1739). A treatise of human nature (Book 2, Part 3, Section 7). Retrieved from https://davidhume.org/texts/t/2/3/7.
- Iacoboni, M. (2022). Mirror neurons, empathy, and the other. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology.
- Jankowiak-Siuda, K., Rymarczyk, K., & Grabowska, A. (2011). How we empathize with others: a neurobiological perspective. Medical science monitor: international medical journal of experimental and clinical research, 17(1), RA18.
- Kumar, S., Choudhary, S., Kumar, R., Kumar, A., Pal, P., & Mahajan, K. (2019). Animal sentience and welfare: An overview. International Journal of Current Microbiology and Applied Sciences, 8(8), 635-644.
- Marino, L., & Colvin, C. M. (2015). Thinking pigs: A comparative review of cognition, emotion, and personality in Sus domesticus. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 28(1).
- McGuire, L., Palmer, S. B., & Faber, N. S. (2023). The development of speciesism: Age-related differences in the moral view of animals. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 14(2), 228-237.
- Rekiel, A., Wieczorek, M., & Więcek, J. (2023). Cognitive processes, behaviour, and intelligence of pigs. Rocznik Nauk Zootycznych, 50(2), 131-148.